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Abstract
This work investigates the problem of cache-aided content Secure and demand Private Linear
Function Retrieval (SP-LFR), where three constrains are imposed on the coded caching system: a)
each user is interested in retrieving an arbitrary linear combination of the files in the server’s library;
b) the content of the library must be kept secure from a wiretapper who obtains the signal sent by
the server; and c) any subset of users together can not obtain any information about the demands of
the remaining users. A procedure is proposed to derive a SP-LFR scheme from a given Placement
Delivery Array (PDA), known to give coded caching schemes with low subpacketization for systems
with neither security nor privacy constraints. This procedure uses the superposition of security keys
and privacy keys in both the cache placement and transmitted signal to guarantee content security and
demand privacy, respectively. In particular, among all PDA-based SP-LFR schemes, the memory-load
pairs achieved by the PDA describing the Maddah-Ali and Niesen’s scheme are Pareto-optimal and
have the lowest subpacketization. No such strong performance guarantees on PDA were known in the
literature. Moreover, the achieved load-memory tradeoff is optimal to within a constant multiplicative
gap except for the small memory regime when the number of file is smaller than the number of users.
Remarkably, the memory-load tradeoff does not increase compared to the best known schemes that only
guarantee content security in all regimes or only demand privacy in some regime.
Index Terms
Coded caching; content security; demand privacy; placement delivery array; key superposition;
subpacketization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coded caching is a known technique to reduce the communication load at peak times in
networks with cache-enabled users. A coded caching system is a network composed of a server
connected to K users through a shared-link, where the server has access to a library of N files
and each user can cache up to M files. The system operates in two phases. When the network
is not congested, the server pushes some contents into the user’s cache (placement phase).
During peak times, each user demands one file from the file library, and the server responds by
sending a signal over the shared link to enable every user to decode its demand files (delivery
phase). Coded caching reduces the worst-case communication load (or just load for short in the
following) in the delivery phase by designing the cache contents in the placement phase so as
to create multicasting opportunities in the delivery phase regardless of the demanded files.
Coded caching was first proposed by Maddah-Ali and Niesen (MAN) [1]. The MAN scheme
was proved to achieve the information-theoretical optimal memory-load tradeoff among all
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2uncoded placement schemes when N ≥ K [2]. By removing some redundant transmissions, the
optimal load-memory tradeoff among all uncoded placement schemes was completely character-
ized in [3], [4]. Improved achievable loads by using coded placement were obtained in [5]–[7].
Information-theoretic converse bounds were obtained in [8]–[10]. In particular, the best known
converse indicates that the achievable tradeoff in [4] is to within a constant multiplicative gap
of 2.00884 from the (unknown) information-theoretic optimal tradeoff [10]. The security of the
files in the library against eavesdroppers and the privacy of user demands are both important
aspects in practical systems. In the coded caching literature, information-theoretic security and
demand privacy were considered separately, to the best of our knowledge – a gap that this works
aims to close.
Content security was studied in [11], [12]. In [11], the system needs to protect the content
of the library against a wiretapper who obtains the signal sent by the server in the delivery
phase. The proposed achievable scheme uses security keys shared between the users to secure
the transmitted signal. It was showed in [11] that the achieved load of security key scheme is
optimal to within a multiplicative gap of 17 when M ≥ max{1 + (K−N)(N−1)
KN
, 1
}
. The set up
studied in [12] is such that each user should not obtain any information beyond its demanded
file. The proposed scheme creates equal-size shares for each file such that the cached shares at
each user do not reveal any information about the files, and multicast coding is employed on
the shares. It was showed that the load of the scheme is within a multiplicative gap of 16 when
M ≥ max{1 + N(K−N)
(N−1)K+N , 1
}
.
Demand privacy was studied in [13]–[16], where a user should not gain any information
about the index of the file demanded file by another user from the transmitted signal. A way
to insure demand privacy is to design a delivery scheme to serve virtual users in addition to
the actual users [17]. The observation is that given a known non-private coded caching scheme
for NK users (e.g., the schemes in [1] or [4]), the users randomly and privately choose their
cache contents from the NK caches without replacement. A given demand vector of the K users
is then extended to a demands for NK users (including K real users and N(K − 1) virtual
users) such that each file is requested exactly K times. The server sends the signal to satisfy the
extended requests of NK users according to the non-private scheme. The demand privacy for
the real users is guaranteed since each real user can not distinguish the demands of real from
those of the virtual users.
In our recent work [18], the demand privacy is enforced against colluding users, that is, any
subset of users can not obtain any information about the demands of the other users, even if they
exchange their cache content. This problem was mentioned in the device-to-device setup [19].
Our proposed scheme in [18] uses privacy keys, and was inspired by a recent work on cache-
aided linear function retrieval in [20] that showed that allowing users to retrieve arbitrary linear
combinations of files does not worsen the achievable memory-load tradeoff compared to just
retrieving single files. The key idea in [18] is that each user caches, in addition to the uncoded
cached content as in [1], also a privacy key formed as a random linear combination of the content
that was not cached in [1]. Given the set of files demanded by the users, the server sends multicast
signals so that each user can retrieve a specific linear combination of files (related to the stored
privacy key). The decoded linear combination together with the privacy key allows each user
to retieve the demanded file. In certain regimes the scheme proposed in [18] outperforms the
virtual user scheme in [13] in terms of load-memory tradeoff, and in general has a significant
lower subpacketization, which refers to the minimum file length needed to realize the scheme.
3A. Paper Contributions
In this paper, we investigate content Secure and demand Private Linear Function Retrieval
(SP-LFR) systems, where the following constrains are simultaneously imposed:
L: each user is interested in downloading a linear combination of files at the server;
S: the files must be kept secure from a wiretapper who observes the transmission signal from
the server; and
P: any subset of users, who may share their cache contents, can not learn any information
about the indices of the linear combinations demanded by the remaining users thus ensuring
demand privacy.
Coded caching systems with only one of the above three constrains were investigated by: linear
function retrieval in [20], content security in [11], and demand privacy in [13]–[16], [18]. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We propose to use a superposition of security keys and privacy keys to achieve content
security and demand privacy simultaneously. In fact, security keys and privacy keys have
been separately used in systems with only security or privacy constrain. Each security key
was shared by some users [11], while each privacy key was only cached by an individual
user [18]. In our approach, in the placement phase each user caches the superposition (i.e.,
sums over the finite field of operation) of security keys and privacy keys. In the delivery
phase, both security and privacy keys are added to the multicast signals. It turns out that
this superposition strategy insures both the content is secure and the demands are kept
private. Key superposition neither increases the memory size nor the communication load
compared to schemes with either only security or only privacy keys.
2) We propose a procedure to obtain an SP-LFR scheme from a Placement Delivery Array
(PDA) by incorporating the idea of key superpositions and linear function retrieval into
the PDA framework originally developed in [21]. A PDA characterizes the placement
and delivery phases with a single array in coded caching systems with none of the three
constrains studied in this paper. The advantage of leveraging the PDA framework is that
we can conveniently transform all existing PDA structures into SP-LFR schemes. It is
well known that, with fixed number of files and memory size, the subpacketization of
MAN-based schemes increases exponentially with the number of users, and so do the
versions with any one the the three constrains above. Fortunately, there have been extensive
researches on low subpacketization coded caching schemes in the literature [21]–[26], most
of which can be characterized by PDA. As a result, characterizing SP-LFR schemes with
PDAs makes it possible to conveniently transform those existing low subpacketization
structures into SP-LFR schemes.
3) Among those existing PDAs, the PDAs describing the MAN scheme, referred to as MAN-
PDA in the following, is of particular importantance. We show that the memory-load pairs
achieved by MAN-PDA in the SP-LFR setup are Pareto-optimal among all PDA based SP-
LFR schemes, and the subpacketization is the lowest subpacketization needed to achieve
those points within the PDA framework. No such strong performance gurantee on PDA has
been previously reported in the coded caching literature. Remarkably, the MAN-PDA based
SP-LFR scheme does not increase the memory-load tradeoff compared to the best known
tradeoff with only security constraint in all regimes, or that with only privacy constraint
in some regime. Moreover, the load-memory tradeoff achieved by the MAN-PDA based
SP-LFR scheme is shown to be optimal to within a constant multiplicative gap, except
4for the regime M ∈ [1, 2), K > N . In addition, the largest constant obtained is 8, which
improves the constant 17 found in [11] for systems with only a security constrain.
B. Paper Organization
Section II introduces the problem formulation. Section III reviews the definition of PDA
and presents an illustrative example. Section IV summarizes the main results of this paper
with detailed proofs deferred to Sections V–VII. Section VIII presents some numerical results.
Section IX concludes the paper. Some proofs can be found in Appendix.
C. Notations
We use R+ to denote the set of non-negative real numbers and Fq to denote the finite field
with q elements for prime power q. For a positive integer n, Fnq is the n dimensional vector
space over Fq, and [n] is the set of the first n positive integers {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a sequence
of variables indexed by positive integers Z1, Z2, . . . , and an index set S, we use the notation
ZS , {Zi : i ∈ S}. For integers m,n, we use
(
n
m
)
to denote the binomial coefficient n!
m!(n−m)! ,
and adopt the convention
(
n
m
)
= 0 if m > n. We use the notations “ + ” and “
∑
” to denote
the addition and summations on both real field and the finite field Fq respectively, where the
meaning of those symbols are clear from the contexts. We reserve the notation “⊕ ” to denote
the Exclusive OR (XOR) operation. We use Pr{·} to denote the probability of an event. In the
proofs of chain (in)equalities, we specify the relevant equations needed to justify the steps by
the equation numbers on top of the (in)equality symbols. We let e1, . . . , eN be the standard unit
vectors over FNq , i.e., en is the vector in FNq such that the n-th digit is one and all the other
digits are zeros. The order notation Θ(n) means that there exists some a, b, c ∈ R+ where a ≤ b
such that, for any n ≥ c, a ≤ Θ(n)
n
≤ b.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let N,K,B be positive integers. An (N,K) caching system consists of a server with N files
W1,W2, . . . ,WN and K users 1, 2, . . . , K, where the server is connected to the users via an
error-free shared link. The N files are identically and uniformly distributed over FBq , for some
prime power integer q, and for some integer B denoting the file length. Each user k ∈ [K] has
a memory of size MB bits1 for some M ∈ [0, N ].
The system operates in two phases as follows.
Placement Phase: The server privately generates a random variable P from some probability
space P . Then it fills the cache of each user k ∈ [K] with a cache function ϕk : P×FNBq 7→ FMBq .
The cache content of user k is
Zk = ϕk(P,W[N ]), ∀ k ∈ [K]. (1)
The quantity M is the memory size at each user.
1We implicitly assume that B is sufficient large so that MB and RB (see the notion of worst-case load) are integers.
5Delivery Phase: Each user k ∈ [K] demands dk = (dk,1, . . . , dk,N)> ∈ FNq , which means
it aims to retrieve the linear combination
Wdk , dk,1 ·W1 + . . .+ dk,N ·WN , (2)
where the addition and multiplication are operated symbol-wise on the finite field Fq.
The file library W[N ], the randomness P and the demands d1, . . . ,dK are independent, that is
H(d[K], P,W[N ]) =
K∑
k=1
H(dk) +H(P ) +
N∑
n=1
H(Wn), (3)
where the base of the logarithm is q.
Then the server creates a signal X by using the encoding function φ : P×FKNq ×FNBq 7→ FRBq ,
for some R ≥ 0. The transmitted signal is
X = φ(P,d[K],W[N ]). (4)
The quantity R is called the worst-case load of the system.
The following conditions must hold for an SP-LFR scheme:
[Correctness] H(Wdk |X,dk, Zk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ [K], (5)
[Security] I(W[N ];X) = 0, (6)
[Privacy] I(d[K]\S ;X,dS , ZS |W[N ]) = 0, ∀S ⊆ [K],S 6= ∅. (7)
Objective: A memory-load pair (M,R) ∈ [1, N ] × R+ is said to be achievable if there
exists a scheme such that all the conditions in (5)–(7) are satisfied. The optimal load-memory
tradeoff of the system is defined as
R∗(M) = lim inf
B→+∞
{R : (M,R) is achievable}. (8)
In this paper, our main objective is to characterize the optimal worst-case load-memory tradeoff
R∗(M). But we are also interested in the subpacketization level, defined as the minimum number
B needed to realize the scheme.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the case N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2, since for N = 1 demand
privacy is impossible (i.e., there only one possible file to demand) while for K = 1 privacy
is trivial and the optimal load-memory tradeoff guaranteeing the security is characterized by
R∗(M) = 1− M−1
N−1 [11].
Remark 1 (Independence of the transmit signal). The security condition in (6) guarantees that
a wiretapper, who is not a user in the system and observes the delivery signal, can not obtain
any information about the contents of the files. The privacy condition in (7) guarantees that a
subset of users who exchange their cache contents cannot jointly learn any information on the
demands of the other users, regardless of the file realizations. In Appendix A we show that the
conditions in (6) and (7) together imply
I(W[N ],d[K];X) = 0, (9)
that is, the wiretapper having access to X in fact can not obtain any information on both
the contents of the files and the demands of the users2. In other words, the random variable
2Note that if we could take S = ∅ in (7) then we would trivially obtain the condition in (9) as I(W[N ];X) +
I(d[K];X|W[N ]) = I(W[N ],d[K];X) = 0; but S = ∅ is not allowed in (7), thus the derivation in Appendix A.
6W1, . . . ,WN ,d1, . . . ,dK , X are mutually independent, where the crucial resource to insure
independence in (9) is the availability of the randomness P at the server. Notice that, (9) implies
the security condition (6), but does not imply the privacy condition (7) due to the presence of
ZS .
Remark 2 (Minimum memory size). It was proved in [11] that, in order to guarantee the
correctness condition in (5) and the security condition in (6) simultaneously, the memory size
M has to be no less than one. In fact, consider d1 = e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)>, i.e., user 1 wants to
decode the file W1, then
B
(3)
= H(W1 |d1 = e1) (10)
= I(W1;X,Z1 |d1 = e1) +H(W1 |X,Z1,d1 = e1) (11)
(5),(9)
= I(W1;Z1 |X,d1 = e1) (12)
≤ H(Z1 |d1 = e1) (13)
(1),(9)
= H(Z1) ≤MB. (14)
Thus the load-memory tradeoff is defined for M ∈ [1, N ].
Remark 3 (Possible notions of privacy). Different definitions of demand privacy for file retrieval
have been used in the literature, such as [13]–[16]. Here we adopt the definition in [18], which is
the strongest among the definitions used in the literature and is motivated by the need to insure
privacy regardless of the file distribution3.
Remark 4 (Naming convention). The correctness condition in (5) insures that each user can
decode its demanded linear function of the files. We shall refer to a scheme satisfying (5) as
Linear Function Retrieval (LFR) scheme. If in addition the scheme satisfies either (6) or (7), we
shall refer to it as a Secure LFR (S-LFR) scheme or a Private LFR (P-LFR) scheme, respectively.
If we impose the restriction that the demands d1, . . . ,dK ∈ {e1, . . . , eN}, then the problem
formulation reduces to the case where each user is interested in retrieving one individual file.
Similarly to the linear function retrieval setup, in the file retrieval problem, we refer a scheme
that satisfies the correctness condition in (5) as a File Retrieval (FR) scheme. If in addition it
satisfies (6) or (7), we refer it a Secure FR (S-FR) scheme or a Private FR (P-FR) scheme,
respectively. If it satisfies both (6) and (7), we refer to it as SP-FR scheme. In the following,
we will refer the FR scheme in [4] by YMA scheme, and the LFR scheme in [20] as WSJTC
scheme.
Fig. 1 shows the relationships between those schemes under those various setups. Table I
summarizes the performances of the corner points of known achievable schemes.
III. PDAS AND A TOY EXAMPLE
Our achievable results are based on the notion of PDA [21], originally introduced to reduce
the subpacketization in the FR setup. In this section, we first review the definition of PDA, and
then give an illustrative example to show our idea to design SP-FR. How to extend the idea
from SP-FR to SP-LFR will be discussed in the rest of the paper.
A. Placement Delivery Array
Definition 1 (PDA [21]). For given K,F ∈ N+ and Z, S ∈ N, an F × K array A = [ai,j],
i ∈ [F ], j ∈ [K], composed of Z specific symbols “∗” in each column and some ordinary
3The assumption that files are independent and uniformly distributed is only used in the derivation of converse bounds.
7Fig. 1: Relationships between various caching schemes.
TABLE I: Performances of known achievable LFR and FR schemes.
Setup Scheme Range of t Memory M Load R Subpacketization B
FR YMA [4] 0 ≤ t ≤ K tN
K
( Kt+1)−(K−min{N,K}t+1 )
(Kt )
(
K
t
)
LFR WSJTC [20] 0 ≤ t ≤ K tN
K
( Kt+1)−(K−min{N,K}t+1 )
(Kt )
(
K
t
)
P-LFR Privacy Key∗ [18] 0 ≤ t ≤ K 1 + t(N−1)
K
( Kt+1)−(K−min{N,K}t+1 )
(Kt )
(
K
t
)
P-FR
Privacy Key∗ [18] 0 ≤ t ≤ K 1 + t(N−1)
K
( Kt+1)−(K−min{N−1,K}t+1 )
(Kt )
(
K
t
)
Virtual Users [14] 0 ≤ t ≤ KN t
K
(KNt+1)−((K−1)Nt+1 )
(KNt )
(
KN
t
)
S-FR Security Key [11] 0 ≤ t ≤ K 1 + t(N−1)
K
K−t
t+1
(
K
t
)
* In the privacy key scheme, the load-memory tradeoff curve was obtained by taking the lower convex envelope of the points in this
row and a trivial point (M,R) = (0, N), which can be achieved with subpacketization B = 1.
symbols 1, . . . , S, each occurring at least once, is called a (K,F, Z, S) PDA, if, for any two
distinct entries ai,j and ai′,j′ , we have ai,j = ai′,j′ = s, for some ordinary symbol s ∈ [S] only if
a) i 6= i′, j 6= j′, i.e., they lie in distinct rows and distinct columns; and
b) ai,j′ = ai′,j = ∗, i.e., the corresponding 2× 2 sub-array formed by rows i, i′ and columns
j, j′ must be of the following form[
s ∗
∗ s
]
or
[ ∗ s
s ∗
]
. (15)
A PDA is called a g-regular PDA if each ordinary symbol occurs exactly g times.
B. A Toy Example of SP-FR Scheme from PDA
In this subsection, we will derive a SP-FR scheme associated to the 2-(3, 3, 1, 3) PDA
A =
 ∗ 1 21 ∗ 3
2 3 ∗
 (16)
for an (N,K) = (4, 3) caching system.
8Let the four files be W1,W2,W3,W4 ∈ FB2 . Firstly, split each file into F = 3 equal-size
packets, i.e., Wn = (Wn,1,Wn,2,Wn,3) for all n ∈ [N ]. Each packet is of size B3 bits. The
server associates the i-th (i ∈ [3]) packet of all files to the i-th row of A, e.g., the packets
{W1,1,W2,1,W3,1,W4,1} are associated to the first row. Users 1, 2 and 3 are associated to columns
1, 2 and 3 respectively.
In the placement phase, the server first generates S = 3 security keys, and K(F − Z) = 6
privacy keys as follows.
• The security keys, denoted by V1, V2 and V3, are associated to the ordinary symbols 1, 2
and 3, respectively. They are independent and uniformly chosen from FB/32 .
• The privacy keys, denoted by {Ti,j : ai,j 6= ∗} where Ti,j is associated to the entry ai,j ,
are generated as follows. The server first generates K = 3 random vectors p1,p2,p3, one
for each user (or column of A), which are independently and uniformly chosen from the
vectors of F42, i.e.,
pj = (pj,1, pj,2, pj,3, pj,4)
> ∼ Unif{F42}, ∀ j ∈ [3]. (17)
Then the 6 keys, denoted as T2,1, T3,1, T1,2, T3,2, T1,3, T2,3, are given as
Ti,j = pj,1W1,i ⊕ pj,2W2,i ⊕ pj,3W3,i ⊕ pj,4W4,i,
∀ (i, j) ∈ [3]× [3] s.t. ai,j 6= ∗. (18)
The server popultes the cache of users 1, 2, 3 according to A as follows. For each i ∈ [3],
if ai,j = ∗, user j will store {W1,i,W2,i,W3,i,W4,i} in its cache, or else, user j will store a
superposition key Ti,j ⊕ Vai,j . In this example, the contents Z1, Z2 and Z3 are listed in Table II.
TABLE II: The cache contents created according to A in (16).
Z1 Z2 Z3
W[4],1 T1,2 ⊕ V1 T1,3 ⊕ V2
T2,1 ⊕ V1 W[4],2 T2,3 ⊕ V3
T3,1 ⊕ V2 T3,2 ⊕ V3 W[4],3
In the delivery phase, assume that users k demands file Wk, k ∈ [3], i.e., their demands are
given by
d1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
>, d2 = (0, 1, 0, 0)>, d3 = (0, 0, 1, 0)>. (19)
Then the server creates three vectors q1,q2,q3 as
[q1,q2,q3] = [p1 ⊕ d1,p2 ⊕ d2,p3 ⊕ d3] (20)
=

p1,1 ⊕ 1 p2,1 p3,1
p1,2 p2,2 ⊕ 1 p3,2
p1,3 p2,3 p3,3 ⊕ 1
p1,4 p2,4 p3,4
 . (21)
Then, three signals Y1, Y2 and Y3, associated to the ordinary symbols 1, 2, 3 in A in (16) are
created as
Y1 = V1 ⊕ (W1,2 ⊕ T2,1)⊕ (W2,1 ⊕ T1,2), (22)
Y2 = V2 ⊕ (W1,3 ⊕ T3,1)⊕ (W3,1 ⊕ T1,3), (23)
9Y3 = V3 ⊕ (W2,3 ⊕ T3,2)⊕ (W3,2 ⊕ T2,3). (24)
The server sends the signal X , (q1,q2,q3, Y1, Y2, Y3) to the users. Notice that, by (18), for all
i, j ∈ [3],
Wj,i ⊕ Ti,j = (pj,j ⊕ 1)Wj,i ⊕
⊕
n∈[4]\{j}
pj,nWn,i. (25)
Thus, by (21), the coefficients of the packets involved in (25) are given by qj and are known
by the users.
The users decode their demanded packets as follows. User k ∈ [3] has W1,k,W2,k,W3,k,W4,k
in its cache from Table II. Thus, it can compute Wj,k ⊕ Tk,j for any j ∈ [3]\{k}. Moreover,
notice from Table II, user 1 has the keys V1 ⊕ T2,1 and V2 ⊕ T3,1 in its cache, so user 1 can
decode W1,2 and W1,3 from Y1 and Y2, respectively. Similarly, user 2 can decode W2,1 and W2,3
from Y1 and Y3, respectively; and user 3 can decode W3,1 and W3,2 from Y2 and Y3, respectively.
The privacy is guaranteed since from the users’ viewpoint, the vectors q1,q2,q3 are random
vectors independently and uniformly distributed over F42. The security is guaranteed since each
coded packet is accompanied by a unique security key.
Notice that, each packet is of size B
3
bits. Each user caches 6 packets, and the server sends 3
packets. The vectors q1,q2,q3 can be sent in H(q1,q2,q3) = 3× 8 = 24 bits, which does not
scale with B. So the scheme achieves (M,R) = (2, 1).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we present our main results, which is s generalization of the example in Section
III-B. Details and proofs are deferred to Sections V–VII.
A. PDA Based SP-LFR Schemes
With any fixed PDA, we will construct an associated SP-LFR scheme. The following theorem
summarizes the performance of PDA based SP-LFR scheme, which will be proved by presenting
and analyzing the construction in Section V.
Theorem 1. For any (N,K) system and a given (K,F, Z, S) PDA A, there exists an associated
SP-LFR scheme that achieves the memory-load pair(
MA, RA
)
=
(
1 +
Z(N − 1)
F
,
S
F
)
. (26)
with subpacketization F .
By the procedure described in Section V, we can easily obtain SP-LFR schemes from existing
PDA constructions. In particular, the following PDA from the Maddah-Ali and Niesen scheme
is important, referred to as MAN-PDA.
Definition 2 (MAN-PDA). For any integer j ∈ [0 : K], define the set Ωj , {T ⊆ [K] : |T | = j}.
Fix any integer t ∈ [0 : K], denote the set Ωt = {Ti}(
K
t )
i=1 . Also, choose an arbitrary bijective
function κt+1 from Ωt+1 to the set
[(
K
t+1
)]
. Then, define the array At = [ai,j] as
ai,j ,
{ ∗, if j ∈ Ti
κt+1({j} ∪ Ti), if j /∈ Ti . (27)
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Corollary 1. Let RMAN(M) be the lower convex envelope of the following points
(Mt, Rt) =
(
1 +
t(N − 1)
K
,
K − t
t+ 1
)
, t ∈ [0 : K], (28)
then RMAN(M) is achievable in an (N,K) SP-LFR system, where the point (Mt, Rt) can be
achieved with subpacketization
(
K
t
)
.
Proof: It was proved in [21] that At in Definition 2 is a (K,
(
K
t
)
,
(
K−1
t−1
)
,
(
K
t+1
)
) PDA. Thus,
the achievability of the point (Mt, Rt) directly follows from Theorem 1. Moreover, the lower
convex envelope of the points in (28) can be achieved by memory-sharing technique [1].
Remark 5 (Known setups subsumed by our construction). The PDA A in Subsection III-B is an
MAN-PDA. In general, for the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme presented in Section V, when
users are demanding files we have the following. If the security keys V1, . . . , VS are removed (by
setting them to be zero vector), then the scheme degrades to the privacy key scheme in [18]4.
If the privacy keys {Ti,j : (i, j) ∈ [F ] × [K], i 6= j} are removed (by setting the vectors
p1, . . . ,pK to be zero vector), the scheme degrades to the security key scheme in [11]. If both
the security and privacy keys are removed, then the scheme degrades to the MAN scheme [1].
Notice that from Table I, among the best known memory tradeoffs in various previous setups,
the worst tradeoff is S-FR, which turns out to be RMAN(M). Thus, due to the superposition of
security and privacy keys, neither memory size nor the communication load is increased in the
more restrictive SP-LFR setup. More generally, the following facts hold for PDA based SP-LFR
schemes:
• If the security keys are removed, the SP-LFR scheme degrades to a P-LFR scheme;
• If the privacy keys are removed, the SP-LFR scheme degrades to an S-LFR schemes; and
• If both the security and privacy keys are removed, the SP-LFR scheme degrades to an LFR
scheme. In the FR setup, it degrades to the PDA based FR scheme in [21].
Remark 6 (Subpacketization). In the P-FR setup, by using the idea of virtual users, it was
showed in [15] that, one can construct a coded caching scheme for an (N,K) system from any
given (NK,F, Z, S) PDA, achieving the memory-load pair
(
NZ
F
, S
F
)
with subpacketization F .
In our approach, for a system with K users, we only need a PDA with K columns. In many
PDA constructions, such as the ones in [21], [23], the subpacketization parameter F increases
very fast with K. Thus, in addition to achieve the security, our construction has the advantage
of avoiding the boost in subpacketization compared to [15], which is associated to the same
MAN-PDA in the FR setup [21].
The following two subsections shows the optimality of the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme
in two senses. Theorem 2 shows the optimality of memory-load pairs and subpacketizations
among all PDA based SP-LFR schemes. Theorem 3 compares the load-memory tradeoff with
the optimal load-memory tradeoff in information-theoretical sense.
4In the case N ≤ K and t ≤ K−N , some redundant signals are removed in the privacy key scheme [18] in the P-FR setup.
Those signals can not be removed in SP-LFR or S-FR setups due to the use of security keys.
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B. Lower Bound of PDA based SP-LFR Schemes and Optimality of MAN-PDA
Theorem 2. Given a (K,F, Z, S) PDA, if the associated SP-LFR scheme achieves a memory-
load pair (M,R), then necessarily
R ≥ K(N −M)
N − 1 +K(M − 1) =
K − x
x+ 1
∣∣∣∣
x=KM−1
N−1
. (29)
In particular, the memory-load pairs {(Mt, Rt) : t ∈ [0 : K]} satisfy (29) with equality.
Moreover, if M = Mt and R = Rt for some t ∈ [0 : K], then F ≥
(
K
t
)
.
Theorem 2 shows that the the memory-load pairs {(Mt, Rt) : t ∈ [0 : K]} in (28) are in
fact Pareto-optimal among all PDA based SP-LFR schemes, and MAN-PDA achieves these
points with the lowest subpacketization. Thus, it is impossible to decrease the subpacketization
without any loss in memory or load cost. Fortunately, there have been various results in PDA
or equivalent forms in coded caching literature, which pursue low subpacketizations [21]–[25].
From Theorem 1, we can easily analysis their performance when they are used to derive SP-LFR
schemes following the procedure in Section V. As an example, we evaluate the performance of
the constructions in [21] in Corollary 2.
Notice that in the FR setup, MAN-PDA based FR scheme was showed to be optimal among
all regular PDA based FR schemes, and it has the optimal subpacketization among such FR
schemes achieving the same memory-load pairs [21]. In our SP-LFR setup, the optimality of
MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme in Theorem 2 is stronger than its counterpart in [21] in the
sense that the optimality is among all PDA-based SP-LFR schemes. In the other setups imposing
one or more of the three conditions, no such results on PDA have been reported, to the best of
our knowledge.
Corollary 2. For any (N,K) caching system, for any t ∈ [2 : K−1] such that t |K or (K−t) |K,
then there exists a SP-LFR scheme achieving the memory-load pair (M,R) =
(
1 + t(N−1)
K
, K−t
t
)
with subpacketization t
K
(
K
min{t,K−t}
)min{t,K−t}.
Proof: By the PDA construction in [21], for any m, r ∈ N+ such that, r ≥ 2, there exists
P1: a (r(m+ 1), rm, rm−1, rm+1 − rm) PDA;
P2: a (r(m+ 1), (r − 1)rm, (r − 1)2rm−1, rm) PDA.
Therefore,
1) if t |K, let r = K
t
, m = t− 1, then by Theorem 1, the associated SP-LFR scheme in P1
achieves the memory-load pair (M,R) =
(
1 + N−1
r
, r − 1) with subpacketization rm;
2) if (K − t) |K, let r = K
K−t , m = K − t − 1, then by Theorem 1, the associated SP-
LFR scheme in P2 achieves the memory-load pair (M,R) =
(
1 + (r−1)(N−1)
r
, 1
r−1
)
with
subpacketization (r − 1)rm.
In both cases, by plugging r and m into the expressions of M,R, F respectively, we conclude
that the scheme achieves the memory-load pair (M,R) =
(
1+ t(N−1)
K
, K−t
t
)
with subpacketization
t
K
(K
t
)t (if t |K) or t
K
( K
K−t)
K−t (if (K − t)|K). Then the conclusion follows from
min{t,K − t} =
{
t, if t |K
K − t, if (K − t) |K . (30)
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C. Gap Results of MAN-PDA Based SP-LFR Scheme
Theorem 3. For an (N,K) caching system, the ratio of the achieved communication load
of MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme RMAN(M) and the optimal communication load R∗(M)
satisfies
1) N ≥ K, for all M ∈ [1, N),
RMAN(M)
R∗(M)
≤

2, if N = K = 2
6.02652, if N = K ≥ 3
5.0221, if N = K + 1
4.01768, if N ≥ K + 2
. (31)
2) N < K, for all M ∈ [2, N),
RMAN(M)
R∗(M)
< 8. (32)
Remark 7 (Improvement over S-FR). It was proved in [11] for S-FR systems that RMAN(M)
is to within a constant multiplicative gap of 17 of the optimal load in the regime max
{
1 +
(K−N)(N−1)
KN
, 1
} ≤M ≤ N . Theorem 3 improves the constant over all interval [1, N ] to the gaps
in (31) for N ≥ K and to 8 over [2, N ] for N < K in (32).
It is worthy pointing out that the converse we use in Section VII to derive the gap uses
neither the privacy condition (7) nor the linear function retrieval condition. This means that
Theorem 3 also improves gap of the S-FR systems [11]. Since the bound in S-FR systems also
works in SP-LFR systems, the gap result in [11] also indicates that in the regime N < K and
1 + (K−N)(N−1)
NK
≤M ≤ 2, the load RMAN(M) is optimal to within the constant gap of 17.
At present, the gap remains unbounded and scales with N only for K > N and 1 ≤ M ≤
1 + (K−N)(N−1)
KN
. From Table I and Corollary 1, at the point M = 1 (by setting the parameter
t = 0 in the privacy/security key schemes and (28)), it can be observed that in P-FR (resp.
P-LFR) setup, the load R = min{N − 1, K} (resp. R = min{N,K}) is achievable, while in
S-FR setup and our SP-LFR setup, the best known achievable load is R = K. Thus, it seems
that the larger load when K > N is mainly caused by the security condition; closing the gap in
small memory regime when K > N was proposed as an open problem in the S-FR setup [11].
V. PDA BASED SP-LFR SCHEMES (PROOF OF THEOREM 1)
In this section, we first present a SP-LFR scheme for any given PDA, and then prove Theorem 1
by verifying its correctness, security, privacy and performance.
A. SP-LFR Schemes from PDAs
Given a (K,F, Z, S) PDA A = [ai,j]F×K , the server partitions each file Wn into F equal-size
packets
Wn = (Wn,1,Wn,2, . . . ,Wn,F ), ∀ n ∈ [N ]. (33)
The server associates the i-th packet of the files with the i-th row, and user j with the j-th
column of A. Then the system operates as follows.
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Placement Phase: The server first generates S security keys and K(F − Z) privacy keys
as follows.
• The S security keys, denoted by V1, V2, . . . , VS , are associated to the ordinary symbols
s = 1, 2, . . . , S respectively. They are independently and uniformly chosen from FB/Fq ;
• The K(F − Z) privacy keys are generated as follows. The server first generates K i.i.d.
random vectors p1, . . . ,pK from FNq , i.e.,
pj , (pj,1, . . . , pj,N)> ∼ Unif
{
FNq
}
, ∀ j ∈ [K]. (34)
Then the K(F − Z) privacy keys, denoted by {Ti,j : (i, j) ∈ [F ] × [K], ai,j 6= ∗}, are
generated as follows
Ti,j ,
∑
n∈[N ]
pj,n ·Wn,i, (35)
for all (i, j) ∈ [F ]× [K] s.t. ai,j 6= ∗, where the key Ti,j is associated to the entry ai,j .
Then the server k fills the cache of user k as
Zk =
{
Wn,i : i ∈ [F ], ai,k = ∗, n ∈ [N ]
}
(36a)
∪
{
Vai,k + Ti,k : i ∈ [F ], ai,k 6= ∗
}
. (36b)
The random variable P is given by
P =
(
V[S],p[K]
)
. (37)
Delivery Phase: After receiving the user demands d[K], the server generates K vectors
qk = pk + dk = (qk,1, qk,2, . . . , qk,N)
>, ∀ k ∈ [K]. (38)
The server generates S signals
Ys , Vs +
∑
(i,j)∈[F ]×[K]
ai,j=s
∑
n∈[N ]
qj,n ·Wn,i, ∀ s ∈ [S]. (39)
Then the server sends
X =
(
q[K], Y[S]
)
. (40)
Correctness: Let
Wdk,i ,
∑
n∈[N ]
dk,n ·Wn,i, ∀ k ∈ [K], i ∈ [F ]. (41)
We need to show that user k can obtain all the packets {Wdk,i : i ∈ [F ]} by (2). By (36a),
for h ∈ [F ] such that ah,k = ∗, user k can compute Wdk,h directly from the packets in its
cache. Thus, user k only needs to decode Wdk,h such that ah,k 6= ∗. By the definition of PDA,
ah,k ∈ [S]. Let s , ah,k, we prove that the packet Wdk,h can be decoded from the signal Ys,q[K]
and the cache contents in Zk. In fact, by (38), (39) and (41), Ys can be written as
Ys = Wdk,h (42a)
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+Vs +
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n ·Wn,h (42b)
+
∑
(i,j)∈[F ]×[K]
ai,j=s,j 6=k
∑
n∈[N ]
qj,n ·Wn,i. (42c)
For any (i, j) ∈ [F ] × [K] such that ai,j = ah,k = s and j 6= k, by the definition of PDA, we
have i 6= h and ai,k = ∗. By (36a), this indicates that user k has stored the i-th packet of all
files {Wn,i : n ∈ [N ]}. Moreover, by the fact that the user can get the coefficient vectors q[K],
user k can compute the term in (42c). Furthermore, the signal in (42b) is exactly the cached
key Vah,k ⊕ Th,k in (36b) by (35). Thus, user k can decode the packet Wdk,h by cancelling the
terms in (42b) and (42c) in (42).
We prove the stronger condition (9),
I(d[K],W[N ];X) (43)
(40)
= I(d[K],W[N ]; q[K], Y[S]) (44)
= I(d[K],W[N ]; q[K]) + I(d[K],W[N ];Y[S] |q[K]) (45)
= 0, (46)
where (46) follows since (a) q[K] = d[K] + p[K] is independent of (d[K],W[N ]) because p[K] are
independently and uniformly distributed over FNq ; and (b) Y[S] = V[S] + Y ′[S] is independent of
(d[K],W[N ],q[K]) because V[S] are independently and uniformly distributed over FB/Fq , where
Y ′s ,
∑
(i,j)∈[F ]×[K]
ai,j=s
∑
n∈[N ]
qj,n ·Wn,i, ∀ s ∈ [S]. (47)
Privacy: By (46) and I(W[N ],d[K];X) = 0 proved above, thus we only need to prove
I(d[K]\S ;ZS |W[N ], X,dS) (48)
(40)
= I(d[K]\S ;ZS |W[N ],q[K],dS , Y[S]) (49)
≤ I(d[K]\S ;ZS , V[S] |W[N ],q[K],dS , Y[S]) (50)
(38)
= I(d[K]\S ;ZS , V[S] |W[N ],q[K]\S ,dS ,pS , Y[S]) (51)
= I(d[K]\S ;V[S] |W[N ],q[K]\S ,dS ,pS , Y[S]) (52)
= 0, (53)
where (52) follows since ZS is determined by pS , V[S] and W[N ] by construction.
Performance: By (33), each file is split into F equal-size packets, each of length B
F
, thus
the subpacketization is F . For each user k, by the cached content in (36), for each i ∈ [F ] such
that ai,k = ∗, there are N associated packets cached by the user, one from each file (see (36a)).
For each i ∈ [F ] such that ai,k 6= ∗, there is one associated coded packet cached at the user
(see (36b)). Recall that, each column of a (K,F, Z, S) PDA has Z “ ∗ ”s and F − Z ordinary
symbols, thus, the cache size at each user is
MA =
1
B
· (Z ·N + F − Z)B
F
=
F + Z · (N − 1)
F
. (54)
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By (40), the server sends S coded packets Y[S], each of BF symbols, and the coefficient vectors
q[K] can be sent in KN symbols, thus the achieved load is
RA = lim inf
B→∞
1
B
(
S ·B
F
+KN
)
=
S
F
. (55)
Remark 8 (On randomness needed at the server). One important assumption of all secure or
private schemes known in the literature, including our novel SP-LFR scheme, is the availability
of randomness at the server. In our problem formulation, this is represented by the random
variable P from some unconstrained probability space P (see Section II), which can be used by
the server to privately generate whatever it is needed to guarantee privacy (see Section V). In all
known schemes, this boils down to the ability of the server to access perfectly random bits, that
is, i.i.d. uniformly distributed bits. This is a very strong assumption, as what one can practically
have are just pseudo-random number generators [27]. For example, our (K,F, Z, S) PDA based
SP-LFR requires H(P ) = (SB
F
+ NK) log2 q perfectly random bits; the virtual users scheme
requires H(P ) = K log2N perfectly random bits; the scheme with random permutations in [13]
requires H(P ) = K log2
((
NK
t
)
!
)
perfectly random bits when M = t
K
for t ∈ [0 : NK];5 the
security key scheme in [11] requires RtB perfect random bits when the memory size is M = Mt
for t ∈ [0 : K]; and so on. An interesting, and practically relevant question is thus: what is the
minimum number of perfectly random bits needed to achieve privacy?
As part of ongoing work we are investigating this question. The answer is clearly a tradeoff
between load, memory and amount of randomness. To see this, consider the P-LFR setup, note
that on the one hand, by prefetching arbitrary MB symbols of the files to the cache of each
user, the server can send all the remaining (N −M)B symbols to the users without any coding,
thus achieving the memory-load pair (M,N−M) which does not require any randomness at the
server; on the other hand, if we remove the security key in MAN-PDA base SP-LFR scheme,
we obtain a P-LFR scheme achieving the memory-load pair (Mt, Rt), given in Corollary 1, if
the server has H(P ) = KN log2 q perfectly random bits.
VI. LOWER BOUND OF PDA BASED SP-LFR SCHEMES AND OPTIMALITY OF MAN-PDA
(PROOF OF THEOREM 2)
In this section, we first present two known useful properties of PDA, and then prove Theorem 2.
A. Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 1 (Lemma 3 of [26]). Given any F × K array A, whose entries are composed of
a specific symbol “ ∗ ” and some ordinary symbols, denoted by 1, 2, . . . , S, if A satisfies the
condition that two distinct entries ai,j = ai′,j′ = s for some ordinary symbol s ∈ [S] only if the
conditions a) and b) in Definition 1 hold, then
S ≥ nF
KF + F − n, (56)
where the number of ordinary entries is denoted n. Moreover, the inequality in (56) holds with
equality if and only if there are n
F
ordinary symbol entries in each row, and each symbol s ∈ [S]
occurs n
S
times.
5The setup in [13] considers a case where each user requires L out of the N files, in which case it requires H(P ) =
N log2
((
U
t
)
!
)
perfect random bits when M = tN
U
for t ∈ [0 : U], where U = (N
L
)
K.
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Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 of [21]). Given any positive integers K,F, g such that K ≥ g ≥ 2, if
an F ×K array A whose entries are composed of a specific symbol “ ∗ ” and some ordinary
symbols, denoted by 1, 2, . . . , S, if it satisfies the following conditions:
1) each row has exactly g − 1 “ ∗ ”s;
2) each ordinary symbol occurs exactly g times; and
3) two distinct entries ai,j = ai′,j′ = s for some ordinary symbol s ∈ [S] only if the conditions
a) and b) in Definition 1 hold;
then F ≥ ( K
g−1
)
.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In the (K,F, Z, S) PDA A, the number of ordinary symbols is given by n = K(F −Z), thus
by Lemma 1, we have
S
F
≥ n
KF + F − n (57a)
=
K(F − Z)
F +KZ
(57b)
=
K(1− Z/F )
1 +KZ/F
. (57c)
By Theorem 1, an achieved (M,R) pair satisfies
R =
S
F
,
M − 1
N − 1 =
Z
F
. (58)
Then the lower bound (29) is directly obtained by plugging (58) into (57). The fact {(Mt, Rt) :
t ∈ [0 : K]} are on the curve of the lower bound can be straightly verified by plugging M = Mt
and R = Rt into (29).
Assume that (M,R) = (Mt, Rt), it remains to prove that F ≥
(
K
t
)
. In fact, for t = 0 and
t = K, the conclusion is trivial. Now consider the case t ∈ [K − 1], the fact that the inequality
in (29) holds with equality indicates that the inequality in (57a) holds with equality. Moreover,
plugging the expression Mt = 1 +
t(N−1)
K
into (58), we obtain KZ
F
= t, and by (57b) and
the fact the inequality in (57a) holds with equality, K(F−Z)
S
= t + 1. By Lemma 1, there are
K − n
F
= KZ
F
= t “ ∗ ”s in each row, and each symbol occurs n
S
= t + 1 times in the PDA A.
Therefore, the conclusion F ≥ (K
t
)
directly follows from Lemma 2.
VII. GAP RESULTS OF MAN-PDA BASED SP-LFR SCHEME (PROOF OF THEOREM 3)
In this section, we first present four useful lemmas, then we prove Theorem 3 by using the
lemmas. The proof of Lemma 3, 4 and 5 are deferred to Appendix B, C and D, respectively.
Lemma 6 directly follows from the result of [10].
A. Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 3 (Cut-set bound). The optimal SP-LFR load-momery tradeoff R∗(M) has the following
bound:
R∗(M) ≥ max
u∈[min{bN
2
c,K}]
uN − u2M
N − 1 , ∀M ∈ [1, N ]. (59)
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The cut-set bound here follows similar ideas as [11], but with some different steps in the
proof. The advantage of the cut-set bound in Lemma 3 is that it does not contain rounding
operations such as bN
s
c. The technique of removing rounding here is different from but simpler
than the approach based on Han’s inequality in [28]. We will point out the distinctions from
[11] after presenting the proof (see Remark 9).
Lemma 4. The load of MAN-PDA base SP-LFR scheme RMAN(M) satisfies
RMAN(M) ≤ N −M
M − 1 , ∀M ∈ (1, N ]. (60)
Define rMAN(M) the lower convex envelope of the following points
M ′t =
tN
K
, R′t =
K − t
t+ 1
, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K}. (61)
Then when N ≥ K, rMAN(M) is the optimal worst-case load-memory tradeoff under uncoded
placement constraint in FR setup [3], [4].
Lemma 5. The loads RMAN(M) and rMAN(M) satisfy
RMAN(M)
rMAN(M)
≤
 2, if N ≥ K + 22.5, if N = K + 13, if N = K ≥ 3 , ∀M ∈ [1, N ]. (62)
Lemma 6 (Theorem 1 in [10]). Let r∗FR(M) be the optimal worst-case load-memory tradeoff in
FR setup, then in the case N ≥ K, rMAN(M) satisfies
rMAN(M)
r∗FR(M)
≤ 2.00884, ∀M ∈ [0, N ]. (63)
B. Proof of Theorem 3
We separately prove the cases N ≥ K and N < K,M ≥ 2.
1) Case N ≥ K: If N = K = 2, then RMAN(M) is obtained by sequentially connecting the
points (M0, R0) = (1, 2), (M1, R1) = (32 ,
1
2
), (M2, R2) = (2, 0), i.e.,
RMAN(M) =
{
5− 3M, if 1 ≤M ≤ 3
2
2−M, if 3
2
≤M ≤ 1 . (64)
and by Lemma 3,
R∗(M) ≥ 2−M, ∀M ∈ [1, 2]. (65)
Therefore,
RMAN(M)
R∗(M)
≤ max
x∈[1, 3
2
]
{5− 3x
2− x , 1
}
= 2, ∀M ∈ [1, 2]. (66)
If N > 2 or K > 2, since the optimal load in FR setup does not exceed the optimal load in
SP-LFR setup, it always holds r∗FR(M) ≤ R∗(M), hence for any M ∈ [1, N),
RMAN(M)
R∗(M)
=
RMAN(M)
rMAN(M)
· rMAN(M)
r∗RF(M)
· r
∗
RF(M)
R∗(M)
(67)
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(62),(63)
≤
 4.01768, if N ≥ K + 25.0221, if N = K + 16.02652, if N = K ≥ 3 . (68)
Combining (66) and (68), we proved the case N ≥ K.
2) N < K and 2 ≤M < N : For each u ∈ {1, . . . , bN
2
c}, define
Lu(M) =
uN − u2M
N − 1 , M ∈ [0, N ]. (69)
Notice that bN
2
c < K, so for each u ∈ [N
2
c], by Lemma 3,
R∗(M) ≥ Lu(M), ∀M ∈ [1, N ]. (70)
For any M ∈ [ N
2bN/2c+1 , N
]
, define
f(M) , 1
4
· N
N − 1
(N
M
− M
N
)
. (71)
Notice that by the fact bN
2
c ≥ N−1
2
, N
2bN/2c+1 ≤ 1. Thus, the interval
[
N
2bN/2c+1 , N
]
encloses
[1, N ] as its sub-interval. We claim that f(M) lower bounds R∗(M) on [1, N ], i.e.,
R∗(M) ≥ f(M), ∀M ∈ [1, N ]. (72)
In fact, consider the interval
[
N
2bN/2c+1 , N
]
, which can be split into the bN
2
c intervals [ N
2u+1
, N
2u−1 ], u =
1, 2, . . . , bN
2
c, i.e.,
[ N
2bN/2c+ 1 , N
]
=
bN
2
c⋃
u=1
[ N
2u+ 1
,
N
2u− 1
]
. (73)
For any M ∈ [1, N ], there exists u ∈ {1, . . . , bN
2
c} such that M ∈ [ N
2u+1
, N
2u−1 ]. It is easy to
verify the following two equalities:
Lu
(
N
2u+ 1
)
= f
(
N
2u+ 1
)
=
N
N − 1 ·
u(u+ 1)
2u+ 1
, (74a)
Lu
(
N
2u− 1
)
= f
(
N
2u− 1
)
=
N
N − 1 ·
u(u− 1)
2u− 1 . (74b)
Since f(x) is convex on the interval [ N
2u+1
, N
2u−1 ], by (74),
Lu(x) ≥ f(x), ∀x ∈
[
N
2u+ 1
,
N
2u− 1
]
. (75)
Hence, by (70), (73) and (75), we conclude that (72) holds.
Moreover, for any M ∈ [2, N),
RMAN(M)
R∗(M)
(60),(72)
≤
N−M
M−1
1
4
· N
N−1 ·
(
N
M
− M
N
) (76)
= 4 · N − 1
N
· N −M
M − 1 ·
MN
(N +M)(N −M) (77)
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= 4(N − 1) ·
( 1
M +N
+
1
(M − 1)(M +N)
)
(78)
≤ 8 · N − 1
N + 2
(79)
< 8. (80)
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare numerically the performances of the schemes in Corollary 1
and 2, with the schemes listed in Table I. For simplicity, we will refer the PDA based schemes
in Corollary 1 and 2 as MAN-PDA and Lsub-PDA SP-LFR schemes, respectively. In Fig. 2,
we plot the memory-load tradeoff of these schemes in three regimes: N > K, N = K and
N < K, where we choose parameters (N,K) = (30, 10), (20, 20) and (10, 30), respectively. For
reference, we also plot the converse bound in [10], which works for all the above schemes.
In Fig. 2, comparing the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme with the other schemes, we make
the following observations.
1) In all cases, the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme achieves the same performances as
the security key scheme in S-FR setup. In fact, the superposition of the security keys and
privacy keys, as well as the extension of file retrieval demands to linear function retrieval
neither increase the memory nor the load.
2) For the case N > K (Fig. 2(a)), the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme achieves the
same performance as privacy key schemes (in both P-FR and P-LFR setups) on the whole
interval [1, N ]. In fact, for the chosen parameter, the load-memory tradeoff of the privacy
key schemes on the interval M ∈ [1, N ] are given by the lower convex envelope of the
points {(Mt, Rt) : t ∈ [0 : K]}, which is exactly RMAN(M). Similar to the comparison
with the security scheme, the superposition of the privacy keys with the security keys
neither increase the memory size nor the load. It was numerically verified in [18] that
when N > 2K + 1 and 0 < M < N − 1 − 1
K
, the privacy key scheme outperforms the
virtual users scheme in P-FR setup. Thus, in the regime N > 2K+1, 1 ≤M ≤ N−1− 1
K
,
the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme also outperforms the virtual users scheme.
3) For the case N ≤ K (Fig. 2(b) and 2(c)), the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme achieves
the same performance as the privacy key schemes when M is lager than 1+ (K−N+1)(N−1)
K
.
For small M , it is inferior to the privacy key scheme because in P-FR setup:
a) The trivial point (M,R) = (0, N) can be achieved, and thus memory-sharing the
other points with this point increases the performance;
b) For M ∈ {Mt : t ∈ [0 : K − N ]}, some redundant signals can be removed, similar
to the cases in [10] and [20].
In the SP-LFR systems, the above two points do not hold due to the use of security keys
in the signals. Notice that, at the corner points, the additional load in the MAN-PDA based
SP-LFR scheme due to the redundant signals compared to the privacy key scheme in P-
FR setup is
(
K−min{N−1,K}
t+1
)
/
(
K
t
)
, where t = KM−1
N−1 ∈ [0 : K − N ]. This indicates that
when N < K and M is close to 1, the additional load is significant (e.g., at M = 1, the
additional load is K −N + 1), which leads to the observation that the load of MAN-PDA
based SP-LFR scheme diverges from that of the YMA/WSJTC/Privacy Key/Virtual users
scheme in the FR/LFR setup.
Observing the Lsub-PDA based SP-LFR scheme in Corollary 2, it is worse than but close to
the load of MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme in all regimes. The advantage of the Lsub-PDA
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Fig. 2: Load-memory tradeoff for secure/non-secure and private/non-private systems such that (a) N > K; (b) N = K; (c)
N < K.
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is that it has low subpacketization. In fact, by Corollary 1 and 2, for integer t ∈ [2 : K−1] such
that t |K, the MAN-PDA and Lsub-PDA based SP-LFR schemes achieve the same memory size.
Let us denote their loads and subpacketizations by RMAN, RLsub and BMAN, BLsub respectively.
Then,
RMAN =
t
t+ 1
RLsub, (81)
BMAN =
K!
t!(K − t)! (82)
≥
√
K
e
1
6
√
2pit(K − t)
(K
t
)t( K
K − t
)K−t
(83)
=
1
e
1
6
√
2pi(K − t)
(K
t
) 3
2
(K
A
)K· A
K
BLsub, (84)
where A , max{t,K − t} and in (83), we used the Stirling’s approximation √2pinn+ 12 e−n ≤
n! ≤ e 112√2pinn+ 12 e−n. From (81), the MAN-PDA and Lsub-PDA based SP-LFR schemes have
similar load. While from (84), we see that if t and K increase proportionally6, the Lsub-PDA
based SP-LFR scheme saves a factor that increases exponentially with K. It is worth pointing
out that, the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme keeps the same subpacketization as the privacy
key scheme from Table I, and thus also has great superiority over the virtual user scheme, as
illustrated in [18].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the cache-aided content Secure and demand Private Linear Func-
tion Retrieval (SP-LFR) problem, where the users are interested in decoding linear combinations
of the files, and the library content and the user demands must be protected against a wiretapper
observing the transmission signals and any subset of colluding users, respectively. Specially, we
proposed superposition of security keys and privacy keys to guarantee both content security and
demand privacy. Moreover, this idea was incorporated into the Placement Delivery Array (PDA)
framework to obtain SP-LFR schemes from existing PDA results. In particular, among all PDA
based SP-LFR schemes, the memory-rate pairs achieved by the PDAs that describes Maddah-
Ali and Niesen’s coded caching scheme (MAN-PDAs) are Pareto-optimal, and they have the
lowest subpacketization to achieve those points. Such strong optimality results on PDAs were
not known in the coded caching literature, to the best of our knowledge. In addition, the tradeoff
was also showed to be optimal to within a constant multiplicative gap except for the regime
N < K, 1 ≤ M ≤ 2. Remarkably, the MAN-PDA based SP-LFR scheme does not increase the
load compared to the best known S-FR schemes in all regimes, or the best known P-FR scheme
in some regime.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Equality (9)
We prove that the security and privacy conditions (6) and (7) imply (9). The following
conditioned version of Han’s inequalities are useful.
6In this case, each user keeps the same memory size 1 + t(N−1)
K
, and the number of users K increases.
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Lemma 7 (Han’s inequalities [29]). Let X0, X1, X2, . . . , Xn be n+ 1 random variables, define
h
(n)
k ,
1(
n
k
) ∑
S⊆[n]:|S|=k
H(XS |X0)
k
, (85)
g
(n)
k ,
1(
n
k
) ∑
S⊆[n]:|S|=k
H(XS |X[n]\S , X0)
k
, (86)
then
h
(n)
1 ≥ h(n)2 . . . ≥ h(n)n , g(n)1 ≤ g(n)2 . . . ≤ g(n)n . (87)
For any k ∈ [K − 1],
I(D[K];X |W[N ])
K
(88)
=
H(D[K] |W[N ])
K
− H(D[K] |X,W[N ])
K
(89)
(87)≤ 1(
K
k
) ∑
S⊆[K],|S|=k
H(DS |W[N ])
k
− 1(
K
k
) ∑
S⊆[K],|S|=k
H(DS |D[K]\S , X,W[N ])
k
(90)
=
1(
K
k
) ∑
S⊆[K],|S|=k
I(DS ;D[K]\S , X |W[N ])
k
(91)
≤ 1(
K
k
) ∑
S⊆[K],|S|=k
I(DS ;D[K]\S , X, Z[K]\S |W[N ])
k
(92)
(7)
= 0. (93)
Thus, by (7), I(d[K];X |W[N ]) = 0. Therefore, together with (6), we proved (9).
B. Proof of Lemma 3
We denote the signal under the demands D1 = d1, . . . , DK = dK by X(d1,...,dK). For any u ∈[
min{bN
2
c, K}], consider the first u caches Z1, . . . , Zu. For a demand vector (D1, . . . , DK) =
(1, 2, ..., u, 1, 1, ..., 1), by using the signal X1 , X(1,2,....,u,1,1,...,1) and the caches Z1, . . . , Zu, the
files W1, . . . ,Wu can be recovered. More generally, by using X` , X((`−1)u+1,...,`·u,1,1,...,1), the
files W(`−1)u+1, W(`−1)u+2, . . . , W`·u can be recovered for any ` ∈
[dN
u
e − 1]. We also define
XdN
u
e , X((dN
u
e−1)u+1,...,N,1,1,...,1), then the files W(dN
u
e−1)u+1, . . . ,WN can be recovered from
XdN
u
e and Z1, . . . , Zu. Therefore, since W1, . . . ,WN are uniformly distributed over FBq , then
NB = H(W[N ]) (94)
= I(W[N ];X[dN
s
e], Z[u]) +H(W[N ] |X[dN
u
e], Z[u]) (95)
(5)
= I(W[N ];X[dN
u
e], Z[u]) (96)
= I(W[N ];XdN
u
e) + I(W[N ];X[dN
u
e−1], Z[u] |XdN
u
e) (97)
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(6)
= I(W[N ];X[dN
u
e−1], Z[u] |XdN
u
e) (98)
≤
dN
u
e−1∑
`=1
H(X`) +
u∑
j=1
H(Zu) (99)
≤
(⌈
N
u
⌉
− 1
)
R∗(M)B + uMB (100)
=
N − 1
u
R∗(M)B + uMB, (101)
where (96) holds because the files W[N ] can be recovered from X[dN
u
e], Z[u], and (101) fol-
lows from the fact dN
u
e ≤ N
u
+ u−1
u
. Therefore, R∗(M) ≥ uN−u2M
N−1 , which works for all
u ∈ [min{dN
u
e, K}]. This proves Lemma 3.
Remark 9 (New ingredients in the cut-set bound). The proof of this lemma is in fact a cut-
set type bound, but it differs from [11] in two steps. (I) We use dN
u
e signals X1, . . . , XdN
u
e to
decode all the N files, so that the left side in (94) is NB, while in [11], it used bN
u
c signals
X1, . . . , XbN
u
c to decode bNu cu files. This technique was also used in [30]. (II) In (101), the
inequality dN
u
e ≤ N
u
+ u−1
u
is used so that the final lower bound does not contain the rounded
number dN
u
e.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Notice that the interval (1, N ] can be partitioned into K disjoint intervals {(Mt−1,Mt] : t ∈
[K]}. Since the points (M0, R0), (M1, R1), . . . , (MK , RK) are on the convex curve(
M,
K(N −M)
N − 1 +K(M − 1)
)
, M ∈ [0, N ] (102)
the lower convex envelope are formed by sequentially connecting the points (M0, R0), . . . , (MK , RK).
For any M ∈ (Mt−1,Mt], there exists a unique θ ∈ [0, 1) such that
M = θMt−1 + (1− θ)Mt (103)
(28)
= 1 +
(t− θ)(N − 1)
K
, (104)
RMAN(M) = θRt−1 + (1− θ)Rt (105)
(28)
=
(K − t)t+ (K + 1)θ
t(t+ 1)
. (106)
Therefore,
RMAN(M)− N −M
M − 1 (107)
(104),(106)
=
(K − t)t+ (K + 1)θ
t(t+ 1)
− K − t+ θ
t− θ (108)
=
−(K − t)t− (K + 1)θ2
t(t+ 1)(t− θ) (109)
≤ 0, (110)
which proves (60).
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D. Proof of Lemma 5
Notice that since the points (M ′0, R
′
0), (M
′
1, R
′
1), . . . , (M
′
K , R
′
K) are on the convex curve(
M,
K(N −M)
N +KM
)
, M ∈ [0, N ], (111)
the function rRF(M) is given by sequentially connecting the points (M ′0, R
′
0), . . . , (M
′
K , R
′
K).
Moreover, RMAN(M) is convex on [1, N ], so it is sufficient to prove (62) for the points M ∈
{1} ∪ { tN
K
: t ∈ [K]}.
If M = 1, let θ = 1− K
N
, then M = 1 = θ · 0 + (1− θ)N
K
, thus
rMAN(1) = θ · rMAN(0) + (1− θ) · rMAN
(N
K
)
(112)
=
(
1− K
N
)
·K + K
N
· K − 1
2
(113)
=
(2N −K − 1)K
2N
, (114)
Thus,
RMAN(1)
rMAN(1)
=
K
(2N−K−1)K
2N
(115)
=
2
2− K+1
N
(116)
≤
{
2, if N ≥ K + 1
3, if N = K ≥ 3 , (117)
which satisfies (62).
If M = tN
K
, where t ∈ [K], let θt = K−tN−1 ∈ [0, 1], then
M = θtMt−1 + (1− θt)Mt. (118)
Thus,
RMAN(M)
rMAN(M)
=
θtRt−1 + (1− θt)Rt
R′t
(119)
(28),(61)
= 1 +
K + 1
(N − 1)t (120)
≤ 1 + K + 1
N − 1 (121)
≤
 2, if N ≥ K + 22.5, if N = K + 13, if N = K ≥ 3 , (122)
which proves (62).
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